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I. INTRODUCTION
The general rule of medical treatment is that doctors may not act without a
patient’s informed consent.1 Informed consent promotes patient autonomy2 and
safeguards the integrity of the physician.3 Medical and legal experts agree that the
informed consent process is “an invitation, asking for consent, seeking authorization
to proceed, and not making a demand under the guise of a symbolic egalitarian
gesture.”4 This consent process becomes more complicated when the patient is
pregnant because The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
recognizes the fetus as a separate patient5 even though the woman is the only patient
able to give informed consent.
A competent pregnant woman may, for many reasons, refuse medical treatment,
that a physician regards as beneficial to the woman, the fetus, or in some instances,
both. These reasons may range from fear of surgery or other invasive procedures to
a deep religious belief that conflicts with the physician’s recommended treatment.
These reasons may also include the pregnant woman’s desire to preserve her own
health. Physicians may find the refusal of medical treatment at odds with the desire
to deliver a healthy baby. When a pregnant woman refuses treatment that will
benefit her fetus, either directly or indirectly, she places her physician in a dilemma
of conflicting loyalties. The physician must now choose between honoring the
woman’s refusal, which may subject the fetus to a possible fate of injury, disability,
or even death, or despite her objections, compel her to treatment by seeking a court
order.
If the physician chooses to honor the pregnant woman’s refusal of treatment, he
appears to be abandoning the fetus, a patient to whom he owes an ethical and legal
1

Early statements of this axiom are introduced in Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S.
250, 251 (1891) (“[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common
law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free
from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of
law.”) and Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 317 P.2d. 170, 181 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1957) (“[a] physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects himself to liability
if he withholds any facts which are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by the
patient to the proposed treatment”).
2

“The root premise is the concept, fundamental in American Jurisprudence, that ‘[e]very
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with
his own body…’ True consent to what happens to one’s self is the informed exercise of
choice, and that entails an opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the options available and the
risks attendant upon each.” Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(quoting Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosps., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914)), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
3
See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES of BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 67113 (3d ed. 1989).
4
ROBERT J. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION of CLINICAL RESEARCH 99 (2d ed. 1986)
(quoting Jay Katz, The Regulation of Human Research–Reflections and Proposals, 21
CLINICAL RES. 785-91 (1973)).
5
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS COMMITTEE ON ETHICS,
OPINION NUMBER 55, PATIENT CHOICE MATERNAL FETAL CONFLICT (Oct. 1987) [hereinafter
ACOG].
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duty of care.6 If the physician chooses to treat the pregnant woman, he must
ethically justify his refusal to honor the woman’s right to control her own body. This
dilemma may lead the physician to seek and obtain a court order compelling the
pregnant woman to submit to the recommended treatment regardless of her refusal.
Whether it is a physician or a judge attending to this dilemma, the same question
arises: should a pregnant woman be compelled to submit to medical treatment that,
for her own reasons, she does not want?
This note explores the question: is it ever permissible for a physician or a judge
to compel a pregnant woman to submit to medical treatment for the benefit of her
fetus? This note begins by examining the ideology of motherhood7 and the legal
status of the fetus.8 This note then examines the ethical aspects and legal issues
involved in compelling a pregnant woman to undergo treatment for the benefit of her
fetus. This note then explores the controls of pregnancy that result in maternal-fetal
conflicts. Finally, this note examines the court’s use of a balancing test in reaching
decisions in cases of compelled medical treatment of pregnant women.
I argue that neither physicians nor the judiciary should compel a pregnant woman
to submit to medical treatment for the sake of her fetus. This conclusion is based on
a view of the legal status of the fetus and the woman’s constitutional right to privacy.
The fetus is not a person under the Fourteenth Amendment,9 and the pregnant
woman should be afforded the constitutionally protected right to privacy that would
encompass the right to be free of bodily invasions.10 Furthermore, for public policy
reasons, it is not advisable for the law to use its power to invade a person’s body for
the benefit of another. “To do so would defeat the sanctity of the individual and
would impose a rule which would know no limits, and one could not imagine where
the line would be drawn.”11 This note concludes by suggesting that a competent
6

Id.

7

Taft v. Taft, 446 N.E.2d 395 (Mass. 1983) (husband petitioned the court to order his wife
to submit to a cerlage operation in order to hold the pregnancy. The judge ruled that the
state’s interest in the fetus justified and overrode that pregnant woman’s free exercise of
religion. The state’s interest was based on the “fundamental and traditional interest in the
physical and mental health of all parents, their children already born and their unborn
children).
8

In re Jamaica Hosp., 491 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1985) (in this case, the court ordered a pregnant
woman to undergo a blood transfusion against her religious belief. The court regarded the
fetus as a human being, to whom the court stands in parens patriae and whom the court has an
obligation to protect).
9

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.”).
10

Id.

11

McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C. 3d 90 (Allegheny County Ct. 1978) (this court said in
dicta that “Our Society…has as its first principle, the respect for the individual, and that
society and government exist to protect the individual from being invaded and hurt by
another.”).
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woman’s choice to refuse to submit to medical treatment must always be honored
even where her choice may be harmful to her fetus. A pregnant woman must be
afforded the same rights as if she were not pregnant. The decision must be hers and
hers alone.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Motherhood Defined
Motherhood is an enormously complicated term because of its emotional
associations. It is a symbol for the caring, nurturing, and sensitivity that women
bring to a world that is full of conflicts.12 Motherhood has been interpreted as an
instinct, a biological bond with a child, and an unyielding state of being that is the
essence of female existence.13 It has also been construed as primarily a relationship
that develops within a social, political, and historical context, that customarily
requires women to give up and to give of themselves.14
The potential relationship between a woman and her powers of reproduction was,
in ancient motherhood, a power which compensated her for her powerlessness
everywhere else.15 This power gave or withheld nourishment, warmth, or even
survival itself.16 The idea of this maternal power has been domesticated under male
control17 and as Adrienne Rich argues, “[I]n transfiguring and enslaving woman, the
womb-the ultimate source of this power-has historically been turned against us and
itself made into a source of powerlessness.”18
This historical context of motherhood has developed into normative motherhood,
which is a cultural expectation that all women should be mothers and that their
subsequent behaviors accompany this expectation.19 Dominant cultural notions of
motherhood give way to the idea and practice of controlling women with regard to
gestation and childbirth.20 These subordinating social norms are being launched as
legal duties, resulting in the regulation of pregnant women.21

12

JANICE G. RAYMOND, WOMEN AS WOMBS 29 (1993).

13

Id.

14

Id. at 38.

15
ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMAN BORN: MOTHERHOOD AS EXPERIENCE AND INSTITUTION 67
(1976).
16

Id.

17

From very ancient times the identity of the male depends on power, and specifically the
control of others, including a woman and her children. By controlling a mother, the male
assures himself of the possession of his children. See RICH, supra note 15, at 64.
18

RICH, supra note 15, at 68.

19

See RAYMOND, supra note 12, at 30.

20

Lisa C. Ikemoto, The Code of Perfect Pregnancy: At The Intersection Of The Ideology
Of Motherhood, The Practice Of Defaulting To Science, And The Interventionist Mindset Of
Law, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1205, 1207 (1992).
21

Id.
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Women who do not conform to these expectations are considered to be bad
mothers and their noncompliance is assumed to be willful and immoral.22 This is
problematic because women want to be in control of their own bodies. Respect for
people as moral agents to control their own bodies is the backbone to a liberal
society.23 “The paradigm cases of such control consists of situations common to
both men and women and those, like pregnancy, that are experienced only by women
tend to be regarded as special cases and thrown into question.”24 The debate over
these cases is usually innocuous when it involves only moral claims; however, when
it moves into the legal sphere and leads to coercion or punishment, the implications
become alarming.25
Physicians may have a low tolerance for many patients’ refusals of medical
treatment for what is considered to be low-risk invasive procedures, such as cesarean
sections.26 The confusion that these physicians face when an apparently competent
mother decides not to take a suggested course of action and consequently places her
fetus at risk is quite understandable.27 However, the trepidation that the physician
feels should not be the basis of his response, or that of the law, to a pregnant
woman’s refusal of treatment.28
B. Fetal Rights Defined
Historically, a fetus had almost no recognized legal existence before its birth
because it was perceived, legally, as part of the woman.29 However, recent
developments in medical technology have given rise to an established presence
before birth.30 Physicians can now see the fetus, monitor it and check it for defects
and imbalances.31 The ability to see and monitor the fetus as a “distinct entity” and
the acknowledgment that the pregnant woman’s and fetus’ needs sometimes differ,
have led physicians to consider the treatment to be of two patients rather than one.32
22

Id. at 1306.

23

LAURA M. PURDY, REPRODUCING PERSONS 89 (1996).

24

Id.

25

Id. See also V. Kolder, Women’s Health Law: A Feminist Perspective 1-2 (Aug. 1985)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file at the HARV. WOMEN’S L.J.) (a pregnant Nigerian woman
was strapped to the table for surgery while her husband was thrown out of the hospital). See
also In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990) (a terminally ill cancer patient was forced to
submit to a cesarean section to give her marginally viable fetus a chance at survival; both died
within two days).
26

Lawrence J. Nelson et al., Forced Medical Treatment Of Pregnant Women: ‘Compelling
Each To Live As Seems Good To The Rest’ 37 HASTINGS L.J. 703, 713 (1986).
27

Id.

28

Id.

29

Katherine A. Knopoff, Can A Pregnant Woman Morally Refuse Fetal Surgery?, 79 CAL.
L. REV. 499, 501-02 (1991).
30

Id.

31

Id.

32

See ACOG, supra note 5.
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In order to determine which patient’s interests should prevail, courts have analyzed
whatever rights a fetus has against the rights of the competent pregnant woman.33
The courts must first look at the moral status of the fetus and then to policies and
Acts to determine what legal rights, if any, belong to the fetus.
1. The Moral Status of the Fetus
The determination of the moral status of the fetus generally focuses on the
question of whether the fetus is a “person.”34 If the fetus is a person, it has a right to
exist. Therefore, others would be morally obligated to take actions that have the
potential of benefiting the fetus and to increase its prospects for life.35 This
determination “is not made by scientific observation of facts.”36 It is a philosophical
matter that involves debates about moral principles and issues.37 As a result, the
moral status of a fetus is both controversial and unresolved.38
Given that there is no consensus about whether a fetus is a “person” and the
variety of plausible moral arguments about the status of the fetus, it seems that the
resolution of maternal-fetal conflict should not be based on this ambiguous issue of
the moral status of a fetus.39 A look into fetal protection policies may better define
fetal rights.
2. Fetal Protection Policies
Fetal protection policies are positions that are put into written form, and backed
by the courts.40 These policies control, exclude, and marginalize women in the face
of protecting fetal interests.41 Some of these policies have been found to be illegal.
In United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, the United States Supreme Court held
that the fetal protection practice of the employer that excluded “women with
childbearing capacity from lead-exposed jobs” violated the Pregnancy
33

In re Fetus Brown, 294 Ill. App. 3d 159 (1997). (The appellate Court held that a
woman’s right to refuse medical treatment involving religiously offensive blood transfusions
outweighed the State’s interest in protecting the viable fetus). See also In re Jamaica Hosp.,
491 N.Y.S.2d 898 (the Court ordered a life-saving transfusion since the State had a highly
significant interest in protecting the life of the fetus, which outweighs the patient’s right to
refuse). See also Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457, 458 (Ga.
1981) (“[t]he Court finds that the intrusion involved into the life of Jessie Mae Jefferson and
her husband…is outweighed by the duty of the State to protect a living, unborn human
being…”).
34

See Nelson, supra note 26, at 714.

35

Id.

36

Id.

37

Id.

38

Id. at 715.

39

See Nelson, supra note 26, at 715. It is reasonable to argue that a fetus has human value
and significance. It is also reasonable to argue that the recently fertilized egg is simply not the
equivalent of a live born human.
40

Ikemoto, supra note 20, at 1281-82.

41

Id. at 1282.
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Discrimination Act of Title VII.42 The Court stated that decisions that affect the
welfare of any future children are to be left to the parents who “conceive, bear,
support, and raise them,” not the employer who hires the parents.43 Nevertheless,
these illegal protection policies are limited to employers covered by Title VII,44 and
those employers may, instead, provide women with “counseling and education”
concerning certain health risks.45 The point is that this provision of counseling and
education could become coercive, thus allowing these illegal protection policies to
survive.46
It is argued that the often unarticulated bases of these fetal protection policies
assume that women should not make decisions concerning their own bodies and that
fetal interests are superior to those of women.47 Lisa Ikemoto argues that the bases
of these policies “assume that women cannot and should not make decisions for
themselves.”48 This attitude has historically set the tone for the rights of pregnant
women,49 and it reinforces the patriarchal control of maternal power.50
3. Fetal Rights Acts
There have been attempts made to pass fetal rights legislation at the federal level.
During the last two decades, a number of “Human Life Bills” have been
introduced.51 For example, in 1981, there were proposed regulations “[t]o provide
that human life shall be deemed to exist from conception,”52 and a resolution
proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States protecting unborn

42

111 S.Ct. 1196, 1198 (1991).

43

Id. at 1207.

44

42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988) defines “employer” as “a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of
twenty or more calendar weeks…but such term does not include (1) the United States, a
corporation wholly owned by the Government of the United States.…”
45

United Auto Workers, 111 S. Ct. at 1196 (1991).

46

In March 1991, two waiters were fired after refusing to serve alcohol to a pregnant
woman. The waiters received national attention and they became local heros for their stand.
Barbara Kantrowits, et al., The Pregnancy Police, NEWSWEEK, April 29, 1991, at 52.
47

Ikemoto, supra note 20, at 1282.

48

Id.

49
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (This case is characterized as the worst of legal
arguments in terms of equality of treatment of women because the Court focused on the
woman’s procreative functions. The Court stated that “the physical well being of woman
becomes an object of public interest and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the
race”).
50

See RICH, supra note 15, at 67.

51

S. 158, 97th Cong. (1st Sess. 1981) (introduced by Sen. Jesse Helms) (providing that
unborn children are considered “persons” for the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment right
to life); S. 1741, 97th Cong. (1st Sess. 1981) (providing that life begins at conception); H.R.
900, 97th Cong. (1st Sess. 1981) (deeming that human life begins at conception).
52

H.R. 900, 97th Cong. (1st Sess. 1981).
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children.53 In 1985, a bill was proposed to amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964.54
These bills were clearly attempts to restrict women’s rights to abortions.55 If a bill of
this magnitude were enacted today, it would introduce a range of restrictions on a
woman’s reproductive autonomy that could potentially regulate her completely. It
would produce justification for physicians and the courts to subordinate the interests
of pregnant women over the interests of their fetus’.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE ETHICAL PROBLEMS
Research in medicine continues to reveal more and more ways in which a baby’s
health can be jeopardized by the conduct of a woman during pregnancy. As our
knowledge of prevention and prenatal harm grows, so too has public pressure to
change the behavior of non-compliant pregnant women. Well-intentioned physicians
and others concerned with the interests of pregnant women and their fetuses often
disagree over the ethical duties owed to both the woman and the fetus. These issues
can be analyzed from several perspectives.
The American College of Obstetrics and Gynecologists (hereinafter “ACOG”)
has enunciated ethical analysis of certain bioethical problems. Although it treats
pregnant women as two patients, its report notes that a resort to the court to compel
treatment is almost never justified.56
A 1990 report in the Journal of The American Medical Association was based on
the deliberations of the ACOG committee of medicolegal problems.57 The American
Medical Association (hereinafter “AMA”) discourages resorting to the court, but
acknowledges that some maternal fetal conflicts may require judicial intervention.58
And finally, an analysis of the legal position on the ethical problem of maternal fetal
conflicts is necessary because sometimes these conflicts progress from the hospital to
the court.
A. The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists Position
on Maternal-Fetal Rights
A physician generally has four choices when a pregnant woman refuses
recommended medical treatment.59 First, the physician can terminate the physicianpatient relationship with the pregnant woman.60 This choice seems morally
acceptable only if the woman is able to find medical care elsewhere. Second, the
physician can try to convince the pregnant woman to follow the recommended

53

H.R.J. Res. 62, 97th Cong. (1st Sess. 1981).

54

S. 522, 99th Cong. (1st Sess. 1985).

55

See Ikemoto, supra note 20, at 1284.

56

See ACOG, supra note 5, at 2 (see comment at note 5).

57
Joelyn Knopf Levy, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Pregnancy, and Blood Transfusions: A
Paradigm For The Autonomy Rights Of All Pregnant Women, 27 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 171
(1999).
58

See Levy, supra note 57, at 177.

59

See ACOG, supra note 5, at 2.

60

Id.
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treatment.61 The physician must be careful when selecting this choice because if the
persuasion turns to coercion, it becomes dangerously unethical. The third choice that
a physician may select is to seek a court order to compel the pregnant woman to
submit to the recommended medical treatment.62 This is the choice that the ACOG
strongly recommends that the physician avoid.63 The fourth and final choice is for
the physician to respect the pregnant woman’s decision and the principle of
autonomy.64 This choice appears to be the recommended choice of ACOG65 and
probably the hardest one for most physicians to accept. Physicians may have a low
tolerance for a pregnant woman refusing treatment that may be beneficial to her
fetus, yet the physician-patient relationship is based on trust and respect. ACOG
makes clear that in balancing maternal-fetal conflict, the physician should put more
weight on the autonomy of the pregnant woman and honor her refusal of treatment.66
In 1987, the ACOG Committee on Ethics issued an opinion entitled “Patient
Choice: Maternal-Fetal Conflict.”67 The Committee’s opinion states that “the
obstetrician should be concerned with the health care of both the pregnant woman
and the fetus within her, assessing the attendant risks and benefits to each during the
course of care.”68 However, the opinion makes quite clear that an obstetrician’s
concern for the health care of both patients should be apparent by “present[ing] a
balanced evaluation of maternal and fetal expectations.”69 The Committee went on
to say that this concern should not involve coercive action “to obtain consent or force
a course of action,” and that an obstetrician should be cognizant of the principles of
autonomy and physician-patient relationship.70
The ACOG Committee on Ethics further asserted what an obstetrician’s
obligations are in order to promote these principles. The Committee stated that when
a pregnant woman refuses recommended treatment that would be beneficial to her
fetus’ health, an obstetrician should urge the woman to consult with other
physicians.71 It went on to suggest that an ethics committee would be the best source
of arbitration for any further conflict, rather than the judiciary, based on the
“destructive effect of court orders on the pregnant woman’s autonomy and on the
physician-patient relationship.”72

61

Id.

62

Id.

63

Id.

64

See ACOG, supra note 5, at 2.

65

Id.

66

Id.

67

Levy, supra note 57, at 176; see also ACOG, supra note 5.

68

See ACOG, supra note 5, at 1.

69

Id. at 2.

70

Id.

71

Id.

72

Id.
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B. The American Medical Association’s Position on Maternal-Fetal Rights
A 1990 report in the Journal of the American Medical Association contained
findings similar to that of the ACOG in that they discourage judicial intervention in
cases of maternal-fetal conflict.73 The report finds that the physician’s ethical duty is
to act in the best interest of the fetus as well as the woman.74 In doing so, the
physician must balance the interests of both the fetus and the woman bearing in mind
that in no other situation is it appropriate for a physician to require a patient to
sacrifice on behalf of another.75 The AMA concluded that the circumstances of
maternal-fetal conflict are no different.76
The AMA report lists several reasons why it does not recommend physicians to
seek judicial intervention to compel pregnant women to submit to recommended
medical treatment.77 First, the AMA is of the opinion that courts are not the
appropriate forum to resolve medical treatment debates.78 A quick decision is
usually necessary in these obstetric cases; therefore, the judge, who is in most cases
not a medical expert and must rely on the professional opinion of the physician
seeking the order, is asked to make a speedy and informed decision.79 Also, the
pregnant woman is not in the best position because she is given very little time to
prepare a defense of her autonomy.80
Secondly, the report finds that the cases that are selected for a court order are
based on the physician’s individual opinion of compelled medical treatment; which
is an inconsistent application of the law.81
Third, the physician is under no legal obligation to seek a court order to compel a
pregnant woman’s submission to the recommended treatment, even if the woman’s
refusal puts the fetus’ life in danger.82
Finally, the AMA’s report notes that when a physician requests court
intervention, he/she interferes with the physician-patient relationship.83 This creates
an adversarial relationship which may discourage women from seeking medical

73
See Levy, supra note 57, at 177; see also In re Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326 Ill. App. (1994) (the
AMA states that a physician’s duty “is not to dictate the pregnant woman’s decision, but to
ensure that she is provided with the appropriate information to make an informed decision”).
74

H. M. Cole, Legal Interventions During Pregnancy: Court-Ordered Medical Treatments
and Legal Penalties for Potentially Harmful Behavior by Pregnant Women, 264 JAMA, 2663,
2664 (1990).
75

Id. at 2664.

76

Id.

77

Id.

78

Id. at 2665.

79

See Cole, supra note 74, at 2665.

80

Id.

81

Id.

82

Id.

83

Id. at 2666.
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care.84 In conclusion, the AMA report, similar to the ACOG committee opinion,
recommends that physicians be mindful of a pregnant woman’s autonomy and,
except under “exceptional circumstances,” a physician should refrain from seeking
judicial intervention.85
Thus, physicians are motivated to seek court orders to force pregnant women to
submit to recommended medical treatments, not out of a legal duty or an obligation
imposed upon them by the AMA or the ACOG, but rather out of a moral belief that
is based on the normative ideology of motherhood discussed above.86 In balancing
the interests of both of their patients, physicians must mediate their relationship to
the fetus by the woman in whose body it resides.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL ISSUES
When a judge is called upon to rule on whether a pregnant woman should be
compelled to submit to recommended medical treatment he is to draw his
conclusions from consecrated principles.87 A judge may base his decision on
constitutional grounds,88 case law,89 or statutory law. In drawing his conclusion, a
judge must bear in mind that these cases possess great symbolic and precedential
significance on the legal status of women.90 A conclusion in favor of the compelled
medical treatment of a pregnant woman may reinforce societal stereotypes of
pregnant women as being incompetent to make moral decisions.91 It may also
legitimatize a forceful assertion of physicians’ control over pregnancy and
childbirth.92 A judge must, therefore, be wary of enforcing a medical model that
would interfere with a decision that should be a private, family decision.
A. The Legal Position on Maternal-Fetal Rights
Courts are split on the issue of compelling a pregnant woman to submit to
recommended medical treatment for the benefit of her fetus. In Raleigh Fitkin-Paul
Morgan Memorial Hospital,93 the court compelled a woman to submit to a blood
84

See Cole, supra note 74, at 2665.

85

Id. at 2666 (AMA report notes that “exceptional circumstances” encompass refusals of
blood transfusions because a transfusion poses little risk to the woman, is minimally invasive,
and in most cases has the potential to save the fetus’s life).
86

See RAYMOND, supra note 12, at 47-50.

87
George J. Annas, Forced Cesareans: The Most Unkindest Cut Of All, 12 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 16 (1982) (quoting Application of the President & Directors of Georgetown
College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, 1010).
88

Id.

89

Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 457.

90

Janet Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions & Interventions: What’s Wrong With Fetal Rights,
10 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 9, 47 (citing Flanigan, Fleeing the Law: A Matter of Faith, DET. FREE
PRESS, June 29, 1982, at 3A; Flanigan, Mom Follows Belief, Gives Birth In Hiding, DET. FREE
PRESS, June 28, 1982, at 3A.
91

Id.

92

Id.

93

201 A.2d 537 (1964).
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transfusion to save the viable fetus that she was carrying.94 The court reasoned that
“the unborn…[are] entitled to the law’s protection.”95 This reasoning was based on
the court’s earlier holding in State v. Perricone96 which held that “the State’s concern
for the welfare of an infant justified blood transfusions.”97 The court in Raleigh
failed to consider the woman’s rights as a Jehovah’s Witness to refuse a blood
transfusion because “the welfare of the child and the mother are so intertwined and
inseperable that it would be impracticable to attempt to distinguish between them
with respect to the sundry factual patterns….”98
In Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital Authority,99 the earliest reported
opinion involving a pregnant woman’s right to refuse a cesarean section, the court
authorized a cesarean section that was refused by a woman for religious reasons.100
The court held that “because the life of defendant and of the unborn child are …
inseparable, the Court deems it appropriate to infringe upon the wishes of the mother
to the extent necessary to give the child an opportunity to live.”101 The court went on
to find that the intrusion into the life of the woman is outweighed by the State’s duty
to protect the fetus.102 The court’s only legal basis for this finding is Roe v. Wade,103
which the court characterized as “prohibiting the arbitrary termination of the life of
an unborn fetus.”104 However, the Roe court did not find that the State has an interest
in a fetus sufficient to compel a pregnant woman to submit to medical treatment
against her will.105
Other courts have honored the woman’s right to refuse recommended medical
treatment. In In re Baby Boy Doe,106 the court held that a competent woman’s choice
to refuse to undergo a cesarean section must be honored, even where her choice may
be harmful to her fetus.107 The court went on to find that there should be no
balancing of maternal-fetal interests and that a woman’s choice to refuse medical
treatment as invasive as a cesarean section must be honored.108 The majority also

94

Id.

95

Id. at 423.

96

181 A.2d 751 (N.J. 1962).

97

Id.

98

201 A.2d 537 (1964).

99

274 S.E.2d at 457.

100

Id.

101

Id. at 458.

102

Id. at 460.

103

410 U.S. 113 (1973).

104

Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d 457.

105

See Levy, supra note 57, at 181; see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 113, 157.

106

632 N.E.2d 326.

107

Id.

108

Id.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol49/iss1/8

12

2001]

COMPELLED MEDICAL TREATMENT OF PREGNANT WOMEN

145

suggested that an order compelling a pregnant woman to undergo an invasive
procedure would violate her constitutional rights.109
In Taft v. Taft,110 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts vacated the lower
court’s ruling and found that the defendant wife could not be ordered to submit to a
cerlage or “purse string” operation to hold the pregnancy.111 Justice Wilkins
reasoned that the woman has a constitutional right to privacy and that the State failed
to show circumstances so compelling as to justify the invasion of this right.112 The
justices further reasoned that no case was cited to them, nor have they found one, in
which a court ordered a pregnant woman to submit to medical treatment to benefit a
fetus not then viable.113
Thus, there are two approaches the courts use when deciding to honor a woman’s
refusal to submit to recommended medical treatment. One is an “absolute approach”
that gives the pregnant woman an absolute right to refuse treatment. The other is a
“balancing approach” or test, where the court weighs the interests of the woman and
the fetus and concludes that the woman’s interest outweighs that of her fetus. In
using the balancing test, the courts usually base their conclusion on the constitutional
rights of the woman.
B. Constitutional Issues
When courts honor a pregnant woman’s right to refuse recommended medical
treatment they do so based on several fundamental rights that are granted in the
United States Constitution.114 First, they recognize the fundamental right to refuse
medical treatment that is accorded to all competent adults.115 Second, they recognize
an individual’s right of privacy which is implicitly granted in the Fourth
Amendment.116 Finally, they also recognize the First Amendment freedom of
religion as a fundamental right in determining one’s destiny.117
1. The Right of Privacy
The United States Constitution protects an individual’s right to bodily integrity.
A number of courts have expressly recognized this constitutional right of privacy.118
For example, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, stated:
109

Id. at 394.

110

446 N.E.2d at 395.

111

Id. at 396.

112

Id. at 397.

113

Id.

114

Rebekah R. Arch, R.N., The Maternal-Fetal Rights Dilemma: Honoring A Woman’s
Choice Of Medical Care During Pregnancy, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 637, 659
(1996) (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
115

Id.

116

Id. See also U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

117

See Arch, supra note 114, at 657; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.

118

See Nelson, supra note 26, at 747.
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[A]rising from the same regard for human dignity and self-determination,
it is the unwritten constitutional right of privacy…. As this constitutional
guaranty reaches out to protect the freedom of a woman to terminate her
pregnancy under certain conditions…, so it encompasses the right of a
patient to preserve his or her right to privacy against unwanted
infringements of bodily integrity in appropriate circumstances.119
The United States Constitution implicitly grants this right of privacy in the
Fourth Amendment.120 The function of the Fourth Amendment “is to protect
personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State.”121 The
Fourth Amendment also protects the expectations of individuals that in certain
places, and at certain times, they have, the right to be left alone; and this is one of the
most valued rights an individual has. A pregnant woman has just as strong an
interest in protecting her bodily integrity as a non-pregnant woman, and the
constitutional guaranty of the right of privacy should reach her as well. However,
while the pregnant woman’s right of privacy is strong, the question that remains is
whether it is strong enough to withstand the challenge of compelled medical
treatment when the health of her fetus is at risk.122
In In re Baby Doe, the Appellate Court of Illinois applied the Fourth
Amendment’s guaranty of the right to privacy to pregnant women.123 The court held
that a pregnant woman retains the same right to refuse medical treatment that she can
exercise when she is not pregnant.124 In recognition of a pregnant woman’s rights,
the court “explicitly rejected the view that the woman’s rights [could] be
subordinated to fetal rights.”125 The court, in Doe, following the lead of the Illinois
Supreme Court, went on to say that the “ ‘circumstances in which each individual
woman brings forth life are as varied as the circumstances of each woman’s
life,’…the court strongly suggested that there can be no consistent and objective
legal standard by which to judge a woman’s actions during pregnancy.”126 Doe

119

Id. (quoting Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728
(1977)); see also Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186 (1984) (right of privacy
guaranteed by the California Constitution, as well as by the United States Constitution); Satz
v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (terminally ill competent adult patient
has constitutional right to refuse of discontinue medical treatment), aff’d 379 So.2d 359 (Fla.
1980); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10 (1976) (decision to terminate vegetative existence by natural
forces was valuable incident of right of privacy), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
120

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

121

Winston v. Lee, 105 S. Ct. 1611, 1615-16 (1985) (surgical removal of bullet from
suspect’s chest violated his fourth amendment rights).
122

See Nelson, supra note 26, at 749.

123

260 Ill. App. 3d at 392 (court held that in the context of compelled medical treatment of
pregnant women, a woman’s right to refuse invasive medical treatment, derived from her
rights to privacy, bodily integrity, and religious liberty, is not diminished during pregnancy).
124

Id. at 392.

125

Id. at 401.

126

In re Baby Boy Doe, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 400 (quoting Stallman v. Youngquist 125, Ill.
2d. 267, 279 (1988) (Supreme Court refused to recognize tort action against a mother for
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applied the rationale of Stallman127 and held that “a woman’s right to refuse invasive
medical treatment, derived from her rights to privacy, bodily integrity, and religious
liberty, is not diminished during pregnancy…and the potential impact upon the fetus
is not legally relevant.”128
2. The Scope of the Free Exercise Clause
Along with the right to privacy, the United States Constitution also provides for
religious liberty.129 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof….”130 The Supreme Court has identified two
concepts embodied in the Free Exercise Clause; the right to religious belief, and the
right to act in accordance with that religious belief.131
The Court, in Cantwell v. Connecticut,132 reiterated this belief-action dichotomy
and signaled a trend whereby certain religiously-motivated conduct was protected
from governmental interference.133 In an opinion authored by Justice Roberts, a
unanimous Court held that a Connecticut statute deprived Cantwell of his religious
liberty without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.134
In applying this belief-action dichotomy, the Supreme Court has noted that its
case law respects a private realm of family into which the state cannot generally
enter.135 However, the Court has also recognized that “the family itself is not beyond

unintentional infliction of prenatal injuries)); see also Family Lie League v. Dep’t of Pub. Aid,
112 Ill. 2d 449 (1986) (Supreme Court of Illinois acknowledged that the state right of privacy
protects substantive fundamental rights, such as the right to reproductive autonomy).
127

Stallman, 125 Ill. 2d at 267.

128

In re Baby Boy Doe, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 401.

129

U.S CONST. amend I.

130

U.S CONST. amend I. By way of incorporation into the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court has held that the provisions of the
First Amendment are fully applicable to the states. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940). Therefore, state legislatures as well as Congress are prohibited from enacting laws
that prohibit the free exercise of religion. Id. at 303.
131
Laura M. Plastine, “In God We Trust”: When Parents Refuse Medical Treatment For
Their Children Based Upon Their Sincere Religious Beliefs, 3 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 123,
126 (1993) (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (while the court upheld
the idea that religious beliefs are protected by the First Amendment, it allowed state regulation
of religiously motivated conduct)).
132

310 U.S. 296.

133

Plastine, supra note 131, at 127 (citing Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 296) (although Cantwell
marked a victory for religious freedom, it was primarily decided on First Amendment free
speech grounds.)
134
See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 309. As previously noted, this landmark First Amendment
case was the first to incorporate the provisions of the Free Exercise Clause into the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See supra note 130.
135

See Arch, supra note 114, at 656.
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regulation in the public interest, as against a claim of religious liberty.”136 According
to the Court in Prince, there is a delicate balance between the exercise of parents’
freedom of control over their children and the exercise of state control over its’
citizens.137 The free exercise of religion may yield when the state has a compelling
interest in the health and welfare of children under its protection.138
Application of the parens patriae139 principle has been held not to violate the
constitutional right to freedom of religion when the basis of parental objection to the
medical treatment is based upon a religious belief.140 However, some courts, in
applying this principle to cases involving pregnant women, have held that a pregnant
woman and her fetus “are so intertwined…that it would be impracticable to attempt
to distinguish between them….”141 Accordingly, the courts tip the balance in favor
of the pregnant woman’s protected religious freedom.142 Therefore, since “a
woman’s right to refuse invasive medical treatment, derived from her rights to
privacy, bodily integrity, and religious liberty, is not diminished during
pregnancy…and the potential impact upon the fetus is not legally relevant,” the
courts must honor the pregnant woman’s wishes.143
C. Case Law
The cases permitting the state to compel bodily intrusions do not strongly support
the forced medical treatment of pregnant women for the welfare of their fetuses.
Most of the cases supporting these intrusions are intended to benefit society as a
whole,144 involve the sui generis145 circumstances of a prisoner under state custody,146

136

Id.

137

Id. at 166-67.

138

Id. See also Shannon K. Such, Lifesaving Medical Treatment For The Nonviable Fetus:
Limitation On State Authority Under Roe v. Wade, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 961, 969 n.48 (1986)
(noting that the Supreme Court has upheld parents’ right to make decisions concerning their
child’s welfare, however, this right is not absolute. Under the state’s parens patriae authority,
court orders for certain forms of medical treatments for children against their parents’ wishes
have been upheld).
139

Id. See accompanying text.

140

Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 145.

141

Raliegh, 201 A.2d at 538 (1964).

142

See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-09 (1963).

143

See In re Doe, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 392.

144

E.g., Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918).

145
Of its own kind or class; i.e., the only one of its own kind; peculiar. BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1602 (4th ed. 1968).
146

See In Commissioner of Correction v. Myer, 379 Mass. 255 (1979) (the court held that a
competent prisoner suffering from kidney disease could be compelled by the state to submit to
hemodialysis despite his refusal of treatment, because the state’s interest in upholding orderly
prison administration outweighed the prisoner’s interest).
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or are very minor in nature.147 Many of the cases involving compelled medical
treatment of pregnant women neither benefit society as a whole, nor affect any
significant state interests. More importantly, these compelled medical treatment
cases involving pregnant women are not usually minor in nature.
In Taft v. Taft,148 the court examined whether a husband could compel his wife to
undergo a cerlage or “purse string” operation in order to hold her pregnancy.149 The
pregnant woman refused this operation based on her religious beliefs.150 The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts overturned a judgment ordering the
pregnant woman to undergo the operation in order to hold her pregnancy.151 The
court based a portion of its decision on the lack of facts in the record stating the
nature of the risk to the pregnant woman.152
In Jefferson, the Griffin Spalding County Hospital petitioned the Superior Court
of Butts County for an order authorizing it to perform a cesarean section upon Mrs.
Jefferson.153 The pregnant woman’s physician determined that Ms. Jefferson had
placenta previa and that a c-section would be necessary to sustain the fetus’ life.154
Ms. Jefferson and her husband both refused to consent to the surgery based upon
their religious beliefs.155 Justice Smith, in his concurring opinion, stated that “such
an intrusion by the state would be extraordinary, presenting some medical risks to
both the mother and fetus.”156
In both of these cases, the courts considered the nature of the risk of a cesarean
section to the pregnant woman. These cesarean sections involve surgery that is not
minor in nature.157 During cesarean surgery the mother is under anesthesia and the
surgery itself involves making incisions in the abdominal and uterine walls and then
removing the infant.158 The risks involve infection, hemorrhage, and urinary tract
147

United States v. Crowder, 543 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (removal of bullet lying
superficially beneath skin did not involve any harm or risk).
148

446 N.E.2d at 395 (a cerlage or “purse string” operation is one in which the cervix is
sewn closed to prevent miscarriage).
149

Id.

150

Id.

151

Id.

152

Id.

153

Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 457.

154

Id. Placenta previa is a condition in which the placenta grows over the opening of the
birth canal. JACK PRITCHARD ET AL., WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 3 (17th ed. 1985).
155

Id.

156

He went on to add that the circumstances of this case show that the mother’s chance of
survival without the cesarean section would be no better than fifty percent. Based on this fact,
and medical evidence that shows the risk of a cesarean section to be well below fifty percent,
Smith agreed with the majority and concluded that the order did not violate Mrs. Jefferson’s
First Amendment rights.
157

Joel Jay Finer, Toward Guidelines For Compelling Cesarean Surgery: Of Rights,
Responsibility, And Decisional Authenticity, 76 MINN. L. REV. 239, 275 (1991).
158

Id.
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injury; and these risks are higher among women who undergo cesarean sections in
emergency situations.159 Because these involuntary cesareans are not minor in nature
and can pose health risks to the pregnant woman, courts should refrain from
compelling a pregnant woman to submit to such a bodily invasion.
D. Statutory Law
No state has a statute that expressly grants any court jurisdiction over disputes
concerning a pregnant woman’s refusal to submit to physician recommended
medical treatment when the refusal may compromise the health and welfare of her
fetus. All states, however, do have statutes that prohibit child abuse and neglect.160
Physical abuse has been defined as “[p]hysical injury to a child, including
deliberate poisoning where there is a definite knowledge, or a suspicion, that the
injury was inflicted or knowingly not prevented.”161 This abuse has also been
defined as “violence and other nonaccidental, proscribed human actions that inflict
pain on a child and are capable of causing injury or permanent impairment to
developing or functioning.”162
Child neglect has been defined as “parents’ or caretakers’ failure to provide basic
physical health care, supervision, nutrition…”;163 “the persistent or severe neglect of
a child (for example, by exposure to any kind of danger…) which results in serious
impairment of the child’s health or development…”;164 and “the deprivation or
nonprovision of necessary and societally available resources due to proximate and
proscribed human actions that create the risk of permanent impairment to
development of functioning.”165
The definitions of child abuse and neglect vary among states,166 and all states
have statutes authorizing the state to assume control of a minor whose parents or
guardian have endangered the minor’s health and welfare.167 These statutes allowing
159

Id.

160

Sanford Katz et al., Child Neglect Laws In America, 9 FAM. L.Q. 1 (1975) (includes a
list and analysis of these statutes).
161

Sana Loue, Legal And Epidemiological Aspects Of Child Maltreatment, 19 J. LEGAL
MED. 471 (quoting S. CREIGHTON, CHILD ABUSE TRENDS IN ENGLAND AND WALES, 1988-1990:
AN OVERVIEW FROM 1973-1990 (1992)).
162

Id. (quoting David Finkelhor & Jill Korbin, Child Abuse as a International Issue, 12
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 3, 4 (1998)).
163
Id. (quoting James Gaudin, Effective Intervention with Neglectful Families, 20 CRIM.
JUST. & BEHAV. 66, 67 (1993).
164

See Loue, supra note 161, and accompanying text.

165

Id.

166

See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165(c)(2) (West Supp. 1986) (“general neglect defined
as failure of parent for parent to make an informed and appropriate medical decision regarding
a child’s care after consultation with a physician who has examined the child”); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 201.090(3) (1983) (neglected child is any person under eighteen years of age not
provided with the necessities of life by its parents).
167

See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (West Supp. 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C11 (West 1981).
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the state to assume control of an endangered minor have become the jurisdictional
basis for judicial orders compelling a pregnant woman to submit to medical
treatment for the health and welfare of her fetus.168
The question with respect to these child neglect statutes as the jurisdictional basis
for judicial action in cases of maternal-fetal conflict is whether the fetus is a “child”
within the meaning of the statute. There is only one state that has a child neglect
statute that expressly defines “child” to include a fetus.169 This lack of expression
suggests that legislators were not considering fetuses when they drafted child neglect
laws.170
Two appellate courts have relied on this apparent lack of legislative intent to
conclude that fetuses are not within the scope of child neglect statutes. In In re
Steven S.,171 a California court of appeal held that a fetus is not a “person” within the
meaning of the statute that confers jurisdiction on the juvenile court to adjudge any
“person under the age of 18 years” a dependent of the court on specified grounds.172
In this case, the mother was in the process of challenging her confinement to a
mental hospital when the county sought to have her fetus declared a dependent
child.173 The juvenile court ordered the fetus, and hence the mother, detained
pending its adjudication on the merits of the dependent child petition.174 The
juvenile court sustained the petition and the mother gave birth during confinement.175
The Court of Appeal of California reversed and held that previous decisions had
not found fetuses to be “persons” within the meaning of child neglect statutes and
that when the legislature intended statutes to include fetuses, it expressly said so.176
The court also disapproved of the juvenile court’s proceeding to detain the mother
for two months that resulted in the child being born in confinement and placed in a
foster home. 177
168

Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 458; In re Unborn Baby Wilson, No. 81-108 AV (Calhoun
County P. Ct. Feb. 3, 1981). Watson Bowes & Brad Selgestad, Fetal Versus Maternal Rights:
Medical and Legal Perspectives, 58 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 209-10 (1981).
169

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-11 (West 1981).

170

See Nelson, supra note 26 (citing Myers, Abuse and Neglect of the Unborn: Can the
State Intervene?, 23 DUQ. L. REV. 1 (1984)).
171

126 Cal. App. 3d 23 (1981).

172

Id. at 28-30; see CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (West Supp. 1986) (“Any person
under the age of 18 years who comes within any of the following descriptions is within the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may adjudge that person to be a dependent child of the
court:…Who is in need of proper and effective parental care or control.”). Section 300 has
been used as a jurisdictional cases for the state’s challenge to a parent’s refusal to consent to
medical treatment of a child. In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796 (1979).
173

In re Stevens, 126 Cal. App. 3d at 23.

174

Id.

175

Id.

176

Id. In an influential decision that preceded In re Steven S., the California Supreme
Court held that a fetus was not a “person” within the meaning of the wrongful death statute.
Justus v. Atchinson, 19 Cal. 3d 564 (1977).
177

In re Stevens, 126 Cal. App. 3d at 30-31.
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Similarly, in In re Dittrick Infant, a Michigan court of appeals held that fetuses
did not fall within the meaning of the state juvenile code.178 In that case, a woman
became pregnant while she had a pending proceeding against her for abuse of her
children.179 The probate court granted custody to a state agency pursuant to the
juvenile code.180 The appellate court reversed and held that the word “child” could
be read as applying to unborn persons. However, it concluded “that the legislature
did not intend application of these provisions to unborn children.”181
In contrast, some courts may find that the child abuse statutes do provide a
jurisdictional basis for a petition seeking to compel a pregnant woman to submit to
medical treatment, depending on the court’s interpretation of the law to fetuses. This
is extremely problematic because it is most likely that legislative intent was not to
include fetuses in the abuse statutes based on the critical difference between a fetus
and a live-born child. In order to address the abuse of the former, the state must
invade the body and liberty of the mother.
V. CONTROL OF PREGNANCY
In the past decade, the state has begun to reinforce the idea that a pregnant
woman should conform to particular behaviors in order to protect the health and
welfare of her fetus.182 These controls have taken two forms. First, there are direct
regulations of pregnancy which deny the woman a possibility of choice.183 These
direct regulations are usually imposed by the state through the patient-physician
relationship.184 The second category of pregnancy control regulations is indirect
regulations which suggest that a woman may have a choice; however, a wrong
choice may result in legal penalties.185

178

80 Mich. App. 219 (1977).

179

Id.

180

Id.

181

Id.

182

See Raleigh, 201 A.2d at 537 (the Supreme Court held that the fetus was entitled to the
law’s protection, and an appropriate order would be issued to force the mother to submit to a
blood transfusion). See In re Jamaica, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 899 (the mother of ten children was
ordered to submit to a life-saving blood transfusion in order to protect her fetus). See
Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 457 (the Court authorized the plaintiff hospital to administer to
defendant (thirty nine week pregnant woman) “all medical procedures deemed necessary by
the attending physician to preserve the life of defendant’s unborn child”).
183

Ikemoto, supra note 20, at 1235.

184

Id.

185

Id. See also Johnson v. State, 578 So. 2d 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). Jennifer
Johnson, an addict who took cocaine while pregnant, was prosecuted for delivering a
controlled substance to a minor after the birth of her daughter. The Prosecutor’s theory was
that Johnson had delivered this cocaine to her child between the time the child emerged from
the birth canal and the time the umbilical cord was severed (statute did not define a fetus as a
minor).
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A. Direct Control
Direct control of a pregnancy involves the steps that a state takes to enforce a
physician’s prescribed medical treatment despite the woman’s refusal of such
treatment.186 Consent is the key issue in this regulation.187 Ordinarily, a physician
may not act without the informed consent of the patient.188 Without this consent
from a pregnant woman, a physician may feel morally compelled to seek a court
order to avoid harm to the fetus.189 A state directly regulates a pregnant woman
when a judge steps in and issues an order compelling the woman to a treatment
prescribed by her physician.
Court orders have been sought for forced cesarean sections,190 forced prenatal
treatment in the form of blood transfusions and cerlage or “purse string” surgery,191
forced hospital deliveries,192 and there is a threat of future court orders involving
forced fetal surgery.193
1. Forced Prenatal Treatment
Courts have proven persistence in their willingness to step in and directly
regulate pregnant women. “In a national 1987 survey, Kolder, Gallagher, and
Parsons found that court orders had been obtained for cesarean sections in ten states,
for hospital detentions in two states, and for intrauterine transfusions in one state.”194
Among these cases, the court orders obtained were received within six hours.195

186

See Ikemoto, supra note 20, at 1236.

187

See LEVINE, supra note 4.

188

See supra note 1 and accompanying text.

189

See Nelson, supra note 26, at 721.

190

In re Baby Boy Doe, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 392 (action brought to compel pregnant woman
to submit to cesarean section).
191
In re Fetus Brown, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 159 (the State filed a “Petition on Hearing on
whether a temporary custodian can be appointed to consent to a blood transfusion”). A
cerlage or “purse string” surgery is where suturing is involved so that the cevix can hold the
pregnancy. See also Taft, 446 N.E.2d at 395 (husband sought a court order to force his four
month pregnant wife to have her cervix sewn closed to prevent a possible miscarriage).
192

See Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 457 (hospital petitioned the Superior Court for an order
authorizing it to perform a caesarean section and any necessary blood transfusions upon
pregnant woman before labor begins, which would necessitate a forced hospital delivery).
193

Krista L. Newkirk, Note, State Compelled Fetal Surgery: The Viability Test Is Not
Viable, 4 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 467, 470 (1998). There are no cases to date on forced
fetal surgery. However, as the procedure becomes more available and less experimental, we
can expect to see a case presenting the issue of compelled fetal surgery arise in the courts.
194

Ikemoto, supra note 20, at 1248 (citing Veronica E.B. Kolder et al., Court Ordered
Obstetrical Interventions, 316 NEW ENG.J. MED. 1192, 1193 (1987). The number of states that
court orders have been sought in for transfusions has increased since the date of the survey.
See In re Fetus Brown, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 159.
195

See Ikemoto, supra note 20, at 1248.
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In re Jamaica Hospital, is a case that describes how these court orders are
recurrently met.196 The New York trial court ordered the life-saving blood
transfusion where a woman who was eighteen weeks pregnant refused on religious
grounds.197 Judge Lonschein’s opinion describes the eighteen-week old fetus as “a
potentially viable human being in a life threatening situation.”198 It also describes the
fetus as “a human being, to whom the court stands in parens patriae.”199 The court
went on to say that the state has a “highly significant interest in protecting the life of
a midterm fetus,” and this outweighs the woman’s right to refuse the transfusion.200
A pregnant woman’s right to refuse treatment was also found not to outweigh the
rights of her fetus at the trial court level in Taft v. Taft.201 In this case, the trial court
ordered a cerlage or “purse string” operation202 to be performed on a pregnant
woman carrying a four-month old fetus.203 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court vacated the judgment because the pregnant woman’s constitutional rights had
been established on record and any interest that the state might have had was not
established.204 This opinion implies that the state’s interest might have been
established if the record had contained more facts.
These cases have consistently subordinated the interests of the pregnant woman
in order to protect the fetus, and the efforts to protect the fetus in these cases, as well
as others,205 have often proved pointless. What seems clear is that these women are
being viewed by physicians, as well as judges, as violating the ideology of
motherhood206 because they fail to act selflessly to protect their fetus.
2. Forced Cesarean Sections
In some instances, judges have felt it necessary to step into the delivery room and
order cesarean sections against the wishes of pregnant women. Since time is of the
essence in these circumstances, a judge is usually summoned to the hospital to talk to
the physician and the woman. Judges are not always good at making these
emergency decisions.

196

In re Jamaica, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 898.

197

Id. at 900.

198

See Ikemoto, supra note 20, at1249 (quoting In re Jamaica, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 899).

199

Id. (quoting In re Jamaica, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 900).

200

Id.

201

Taft, 446 N.E.2d at 395.

202

See supra note 160 (accompanying text).

203

See Taft, 446 N.E.2d at 395.

204

Id.

205

See In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1235 (both mother and fetus died within two days of the
court ordered ceasarean section); see also Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 457 (mother uneventfully
delivered a healthy baby without surgical intervention before the Supreme Court ruled on the
parents petition to stay the lower courts order for a cesarean section).
206

See RAYMOND, supra note 12, at 38.
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A famous example is Judge Skelly Wright’s opinion in the Application of the
President & Directors of Georgetown College.207 In this case, Judge Wright, a
circuit court judge, issued an order for an emergency blood transfusion after a lower
court judge refused.208 The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals refused to review the case.
However, several members dissented from the refusal and voiced their concerns
noting that Judge Wright was:
Impelled, I am sure, by humanitarian impulses and doubtless was himself
under considerable strain…In the interval of about an hour and twenty
minutes between the appearance of the attorney at his chambers and the
signing of the order at the hospital, the judge had no opportunity for
research as to the substantive legal problems and procedural questions
involved. He should not have been asked to act in these circumstances.209
This lack of reflection is apparent in two other cases where the courts held that a
woman can be forced to undergo a cesarean section if her physician recommends it
to safeguard the fetus.210 Both of these cases were decided just hours after they were
argued and neither court analyzed the rights of the pregnant women.211 These forced
cesarean cases are similar to the forced blood transfusion cases in that fetal rights are
given preference over those of the woman. The physicians and judges are imprinting
their interpretation of motherhood into their decisions.
This restriction of choice is inappropriate because it is unsuitable for a judge to
act impetuously, without benefit of reflection on past precedent.212 Warren Burger,
former Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court quoted Justice Cardozo on judicial
restraint:
The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to
innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit
of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness. He is to draw his inspiration
from consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to
vague and unregulated benevolence.213
Since the delivery room is not conducive to such reflection, judges do not belong
there at all under these circumstances.
3. Forced Hospital Deliveries
Although there are no laws requiring that all births take place in a hospital, courts
have ordered hospital deliveries for what physicians diagnose as high-risk
pregnancies. In Jefferson, the Georgia Superior Court granted temporary custody of
the fetus to the State of Georgia Department of Human Resources to ensure that
207

331 F. 2d at 1000 (1964).

208

Id.

209

See Annas, supra note 87, at 16.

210

See Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 457.

211

See Annas, supra note 87, at 16.

212

Id.

213

Id. at 17.
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Jessie Mae Jefferson would deliver in the hospital.214 Nevertheless, Ms. Jefferson
delivered a healthy baby without state intervention while awaiting the Supreme
Court to rule on the petition that was filed to vacate the judgment of the lower
court.215 In a Michigan case, the judge ordered a pregnant woman to admit herself to
the hospital by a specific time and date and to submit herself to whatever medical
treatment was deemed necessary by the medical personnel, including a cesarean
section.216 If the woman failed to follow this order, she was told that she would be
picked up and taken to the hospital by the local police.217 Instead, the pregnant
woman went into hiding and delivered a healthy baby by vaginal birth.218
This principle of maternal subordination is spoken of as if it were natural and
rational,219 and yet these cases reiterate the actuality that intervention often occurs
with no specific evidence of necessity. The possibility that women can control their
own pregnancies is disappearing because the increasing weightiness of fetal interests
seems to be enforcing maternal subordination.
4. Forced Fetal Surgery
In 1981, doctors performed the first surgery on a fetus.220 The surgery involved
passing a needle through the woman’s abdomen to repair her fetus’ blocked urinary
tract.221 In 1989, University of California physicians successfully performed the first
major surgery on a fetus outside of the womb.222 The physicians partially removed
the fetus from the womb, repaired a herniated diaphragm, and then returned it to the
womb.223
Even though these techniques are presently in the experimental stage, there may
soon be a great demand for such surgery once it becomes readily accessible.224 Once
these surgeries become more readily available and less experimental, one can expect
to see a case of compelled fetal surgery come before the court.225
The current principle of direct control of pregnant women may greatly impact
future courts addressing the issue of fetal surgery. The unsettled case law regarding
214

Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 459.

215

Id.

216

See Gallagher, supra note 90.

217

Id.

218

Id.

219

See RAYMOND, supra note 12, at 29.

220

Sharon Begley, The Tiniest Patients, NEWSWEEK, June 11, 1990, at 56.

221

Id.

222

Andrew Purvis, Major Surgery Before Birth, TIME, June 11, 1990, at 55.

223

Id.

224

See Marguerite Holloway, Fetal Law: Experimental Surgery May Feed Ethical
Debates, SCI. AM., Sept. 1990, at 46 (noting that fetal surgery may become common,
especially because “most women would do anything for the health of their fetus, despite the
risk”).
225

See Newkirk, supra note 193.
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court-ordered medical treatment to protect a fetus may indicate the possibility of
compelling pregnant women to submit to unwanted fetal surgeries.226 The pregnant
woman’s right to be free from coercion in making reproductive decisions is once
again at stake with this rapidly advancing technology.227
B. Indirect Control
The second category of pregnancy regulations is indirect control. This category
differs from direct control in that it suggests that a woman has a choice. However, a
wrong choice may result in legal penalties.228 The indirect control of pregnant
women is not through medical interventions, but this type of regulation does
continue the cultural practice of requiring self-sacrifice as defined by the ideology of
motherhood.229 This indirect control is seen primarily in terms of tort liability,230
criminal prosecutions,231 and findings of child neglect or abuse based on a mother’s
conduct during pregnancy.232
1. Tort Liability
Since 1946, courts have acknowledged tort actions brought by children for
prenatal injuries caused by third parties.233 Some courts have abolished the Prenatal
Immunity Doctrine,234 allowing children to bring a tort action against their parents as
well as third parties.235 It is becoming more likely that a child could recover against
his or her parents for injuries caused by conception or for harms occurring during
pregnancy.236
In Grodin, Randy Grodin brought a tort action against his mother for taking
tetracycline during her pregnancy.237 Randy’s teeth were discolored because his
226
David C. Blickenstaff, Defining The Boundaries Of Personal Privacy: Is There A
Paternal Interest In Compelling Therapeutic Fetal Surgery?, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1157 (1994).
227

See supra note 2.

228

Johnson, 578 So. 2d 419; see also Grodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869 (Mich. Ct. App.

1980).
229

See RAYMOND, supra note 12, at 38.

230

See Grodin, 301 N.W.2d at 869.

231

See Ikemoto, supra note 20, at 1264-65 (noting criminal transmission of HIV and
criminal prosecution of pregnant women who are addicts).
232

Id. at 1275 (noting child neglect and abuse laws).

233

Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946) (the first case allowing recovery for
prebirth injury).
234
The doctrine emerged in three state court decisions, referred to as the ‘The Great
Trilogy.’ Foldi v. Jeffries, 461 A.2d 1145 (N.J. 1983); see also Hewellette v. George, 9 So.
885 (Miss. 1891); McKelvey v. McKelvey, 77 S.W. 664 (Tenn. 1903), overruled by, Davis v.
Davis, 657 S.W.2d 753 (Tenn. 1983); Roller v. Roller, 79 P. 788 (Wash. 1905), overruled by,
Borst v. Borst, 251 P.2d 149 (Wash. 1952).
235

Grodin, 301 N.W.2d at 869.

236

See Ikemoto, supra note 20, at 1262.

237

See Grodin, 301 N.W.2d at 869.
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mother took this antibiotic while pregnant with him. The trial court granted
summary judgment for Ms. Grodin.238 The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded the case back to the trial court to determine the reasonableness of Ms.
Grodin taking tetracycline for her own benefit in light of the risk to her unborn
fetus.239 The court’s focus was on the reasonableness of parental discretion. This
case strongly suggests that a woman is free to choose, but that her choice should not
be a wrong choice. She must weigh her benefits against any harm to her fetus.
Another child plaintiff sued the laboratories that had failed to identify the parents
as carriers of Tay-Sachs; subsequently the child was born with this disease.240 In
dicta, the court said that if parents made a conscious choice to proceed with a
pregnancy despite warnings that a seriously impaired child could be born, the choice
would be an intervening act of proximate cause to preclude liability of other third
party defendants.241 The court noted that they could see no public policy that would
prevent those parents from being answerable for what they brought upon their
child.242
As this idea of maternal tort liability grows, a pregnant woman’s choices
diminish and the state begins to play a role in her pregnancy. These choices are
coercive in nature, for the woman must always act first for her fetus or risk exposing
herself to liability. Fetal rights in tort would make a pregnant woman legally, as well
as morally, responsible for her offspring’s health and welfare.
2. Criminal Prosecutions of Pregnant Women Who are Addicts
A second indirect control of pregnant women is expressed in the utilization of
criminal law. Criminal prosecutions of pregnant women for acts which negatively
affect their fetuses are another way for the state to domesticate maternal power and
to reinforce the ideology of normative motherhood.243 This practice of controlling
women with regard to gestation and childbirth is strongly expressed when criminal
penalties are employed.
Johnson v. State illustrates this indirect control.244 Ms. Johnson used cocaine
during her two pregnancies. Ms. Johnson admitted using cocaine the night before
238

Id. at 870.

239

Id. at 871.

240

Curlender v. Dio-Science Labs, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).

241

Id. at 488.

242

Id. In response to the dicta in Curlender, the California legislature enacted CAL. CIV.
CODE § 43.6 (West 1981):
No cause of action arises against a parent of a child based upon the claim
a)
that the child should not have been conceived or, if conceived, should not have
been allowed to have been born alive.
b)
The failure or refusal of a parent to prevent the live birth of his or her child shall
not be a defense in any action against a third party, nor shall the failure or refusal be
considered in awarding damages in any such action.
c)
As used in this section, “conceived” means the fertilization of a human ovum by
a human sperm.
243

See RAYMOND, supra note 12, at 30.

244

Johnson, 578 So. 2d at 419.
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her first child was born and while in labor with her second child. Both births were
normal and there were no signs of fetal distress.245
Following the birth of her second child, Ms. Johnson was prosecuted. The
complaint stated that Ms. Johnson was guilty of delivering a controlled substance to
a minor. The prosecutor argued that Ms. Johnson delivered the cocaine to her
children during the time between the child’s emergence from the birth canal and the
severance of the umbilical cord.246 The court sentenced Ms. Johnson to fifteen
years.247 In 1992, the Supreme Court of Florida overturned the conviction.248
More that 160 pregnant women across twenty- four states have been arrested for
drug use. Of the women pleading not guilty, none were convicted.249 Prosecutors
are losing these cases. The courts are finding that these criminal statutes are not
intended to regulate pregnant women and that the prosecutors’ theories are
inappropriate.250 However, the general tone is that they are willing to punish
pregnant women for their behavior.251
There are four states that have carried this general tone by enacting statutes that
make it illegal for HIV-infected women to give birth.252 These statutes make the
knowing transmission of HIV illegal.253 Therefore, if a woman knows that she is
HIV positive and then gives birth to a child, she may well have committed a felony.
If theses statutes are used to prosecute women who give birth to HIV infected
babies, the trend may be to also prosecute them for transmitting alcohol, legal
substances, and nicotine to their fetus. Making drug use during pregnancy a
punishable crime should be carefully studied before implemented. According to the
American Academy of Pediatrics, “[p]unitive measures taken toward pregnant
women, such as criminal prosecution and incarceration, have no proven benefits to
infant health…such involuntary measures are likely to discourage mothers and their

245

Id.

246

Id. at 421-22. Note that an infant is a person under the statute; therefore, the
prosecutor’s only theory was to argue that the controlled substance was delivered once the
fetus became an infant.
247

Id.

248

Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992).

249

See Tamar Lewin, Drug Verdict Over Infants is Voided, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1992, at

B6.
250

See Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, No. 87970 (Mass. Sup. Ct., Oct. 15, 1990) (“[t]o
construe the statute in this manner would mean that every expectant mother who ingested a
substance with the potential for harm to her child, e.g., alcohol or nicotine, would be
criminally liable under R.C. 2919-22(A), [the child endangering statute]. We do not believe
such a result was intended by the General Assembly.”).
251

See Ikemoto, supra note 20, at 1271.

252

See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123 (Michie Supp. 1991); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, ¶ 1216.2 (Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:43.5 (West Supp. 1992); MO. ANN. STAT.
(Vernon Supp. 1992).
253

Id.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2001

27

160

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:133

infants from receiving the very medical care and social support systems that are
crucial to their treatment.”254
Not only is there no real benefit to infant health in using criminal law, it attempts
to define the ideal mother by negative implication in that it declares certain behaviors
as nonmaternal.255 The prosecution of drug or alcohol use during pregnancy is
counterproductive because it is overtly punitive rather than constructive.
3. Finding Child Neglect or Abuse Based on Mother’s Conduct
During Pregnancy
Civil child abuse and neglect statutes are also being used to regulate the conduct
of pregnant women. Although these cases are similar to the criminal prosecution
cases in that the state steps in to protect a fetus and the woman is blamed for
knowingly harming her child, this strategy has proven more successful than the
criminal prosecution strategy.256 The state has a higher success rate in these cases
and the women have a greater chance of losing their freedom, and their children,
because the courts are more willing to recognize the fetus as a person.257 The issue is
fetal personhood, and the corollary is maternal de-personhood.258
In In re Troy D., the court recognized fetal personhood.259 The court reasoned
that “the mother conducted herself in a manner that was dangerous to the child prior
to the child’s birth but with full knowledge the child would be born…the petition
was concerned with the protection of a living child, not with a fetus.”260 Some courts
find this reasoning too encompassing. A New York court addressed a similar issue
stating that “[t]o carry the law Guardian’s argument to its logical extension, the State
would be able to supercede a mother’s custody right to her child if she smoked
cigarettes during her pregnancy, or ate junk food, or did too much physical labor or
did not exercise enough. The list of potential intrusions is long and constitute [sic]
entirely unacceptable violations of the bodily integrity of women.”261
The indirect regulation of pregnant women is more than just a theory. When a
court takes a child from his mother based on conduct during her pregnancy, it is
exercising significant control over the woman. The frame of maternal-fetal conflict
is advancing under child abuse and neglect laws.

254
Abigail English, Prenatal Drug Exposure & Pediatric AIDS: New Issues for Children’s
Attorneys, 24 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 452, 454 (1990) (quoting PROVISIONAL COMM. ON
SUBSTANCE ABUSE, AM. ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS, DRUG EXPOSED INFANTS, PEDIATRICS (Oct.
1990)).
255

See Iketomo, supra note 20, at 1273.

256

Id. at 1275.

257

Id.
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Id.
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263 Cal. Rptr. 869 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).

260

Id. at 872-74.
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In re Torress, No. N-3968/88 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1988).
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VI. ANALYSIS OF BALANCING FETAL AND MATERNAL RIGHTS
The courts recognize a woman’s constitutional right to refuse to submit to
medical treatment that violates her religious beliefs. There are some that believe that
this right should be absolute among competent women.262 State intervention in a
pregnant woman’s refusal of medical treatment has been upheld through the
application of a balancing test where the state interest in the fetus is balanced against
the interest of the pregnant woman.263
In 1981, the Supreme Court of Georgia decided Jefferson using this balancing
test.264 The court balanced the rights of the fetus against the rights of the mother and
concluded that the state’s interest in the rights of the fetus outweighed the rights of
the mother. This case established a pregnant woman’s duty to protect the health and
welfare of her fetus. The court asserted that it was balancing the state’s interest;
however, this decision created rights in the fetus enforceable against the mother.265
VII. CONCLUSION
In this emotionally charged area of the law, the conflict between pregnant women
who refuse medical treatment that may benefit their fetus and the medical profession
or the judiciary that seeks to protect the health and welfare of those fetuses, is far
from settled. Whether it is a judge or a physician attending to this dilemma, the
question remains the same: should a pregnant woman be compelled to submit to
medical treatment that for her own reasons she does not want?
This question cannot be answered solely on the basis of whether the mother or
the fetus may suffer any physical detriment. The fundamental ethical and legal
values must also be taken into account and on balance, these values do not justify
compelling a pregnant woman to submit to medical treatment that she does not want.
The law can take one of two paths when faced with such a dilemma. The first
path is to require the woman to submit to the medical treatment. In doing this, the
court places the pregnant woman in a relationship of servitude to her fetus and, thus,
threatens the very core of her constitutionally- protected liberty.
The second, more ethically and legally proper alternative, is to honor the
woman’s refusal. Society must protect the rights of all competent adults, including
pregnant women, from forcible, intrusive, physical violations of their physical self.
The plight between fetal health and maternal liberty is intertwined with moral and
ethical dilemmas and the strong arm of the law will not eliminate the conflict.
PAMALA HARRIS266
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See Nelson, supra note 26, at 709-11.
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See In re Jamaica, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 898 (using the balancing test, the court found the
state’s interest outweighed the pregnant woman’s interest, but conceded that an opposite
finding would result if the woman were not pregnant).
264
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